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Abstract—Websites employ third-party ads and tracking ser-
vices leveraging cookies and JavaScript code, to deliver ads
and track users’ behavior, causing privacy concerns. To limit
online tracking and block advertisements, several ad-blocking
(black) lists have been curated consisting of URLs and domains
of well-known ads and tracking services. Using Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine in this paper, we collect a retrospective view
of the Web to analyze the evolution of ads and tracking services
and evaluate the effectiveness of ad-blocking blacklists. We
propose metrics to capture the efficacy of ad-blocking blacklists
to investigate whether these blacklists have been reactive or
proactive in tackling the online ad and tracking services. We
introduce a stability metric to measure the temporal changes in
ads and tracking domains blocked by ad-blocking blacklists and
a diversity metric to measure the ratio of new ads and tracking
domains detected. We observe that ads and tracking domains in
websites change over time, and among the ad-blocking blacklists
that we investigated, our analysis reveals that some blacklists
were more informed with the existence of ads and tracking
domains, but their rate of change was slower than other blacklists.
Our analysis also shows that Alexa top 5K websites in the US,
Canada, and the UK have the most number of ads and tracking
domains per website, and have the highest proactive scores. This
suggests that ad-blocking blacklists are updated by prioritizing
ads and tracking domains reported in the popular websites from
these countries.
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost as long as the commercial world wide web
has existed, third-party advertisements (in short ads) and web
tracking practices have been used to support free services [36].
To this end, first-party websites leverage various techniques
such as third-party iframes and JavaScript to show ads
and track users’ activities on websites. While this helps to
support the business model of most content providers, its use
in showing ads and profiling users’ activities raises serious
privacy concerns. Besides, many third-party services such as
ads are being used as malvertisements [34], [8].
A number of studies have characterized and measured
the ads and tracking ecosystem to protect user privacy and
limit intrusive ads, resulting in numerous ad-blocking tools
such as Ghostery [4], Adblock [1], Adblock Plus [2], Dis-
connect [7], and Privacy Badger [6] for the web [32] and
mobile platforms [33]. Most of these tools are fueled by
community-driven public blacklists (such as EasyPrivacy [16],
EasyList [14], FanboyList [17], and hpHosts [18]) and are
evaluated for their (in)effectiveness [44], [32]. Although the
research work in this domain has been on-going for some
time and ad-blocking tools have been developed, we believe
these studies typically consist of short-term measurements of
specific tracking techniques and the ad-blocking tools have
not been comprehensively evaluated over time. Given that
the online ads, web tracking, and prevention landscape is
continuously evolving, studies performed at a snapshot or
longitudinally starting in the present may not comprehensively
illuminate online ads/tracking to improve ad-blocking.
To fill the gap, we leverage the historical data extracted from
the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine [5] to analyze online
ads (resp. web tracking) and ad-blocking blacklists (listed in
Table I). From online ads and web tracking perspective, we
look at the prevalence and the evolution of ads and tracking
domains since 2009. From an ad-blocking and tracking pre-
vention perspective, we measure the longitudinal performance
of various ad-blocking blacklists with respect to their rate of
change and update speed. This paper makes the following
main contributions:
Prominence of a&t domains. We study the evolution of the
number of ad and tracking (a&t for short) domains embedded
in websites over time. Globally, since 2010 the presence of
a&t domains has been dynamic on an average of 55% of
the websites crawled, with 45% exhibiting an annual increase
and 10% of the websites exhibiting an annual decrease in
the number of a&t domains embedded. We observe a bias in
the presence of a&t domains across different countries. with
the Alexa top-5K websites in the US, Canada, and the UK
exhibiting the highest number of a&t domains per website,
whereas China and Iran had the least. We also examine the
number of a&t services detected by each of the analyzed ad-
blocking blacklist (see Table I). We observe that the blacklists
such as Mahakala and hpHosts report the highest number of
a&t services while Cybercrime and Sa-blacklist detect the
least.
Rate of change of tracking prevention lists. To measure
the churn of third-party a&t domains within a blacklist, we
introduce two new metrics: stability and diversity. Although
each year, the ad-blocking blacklists mostly detect a&t do-
mains that have already been reported in the preceding years,
they continue to detect new third-party a&t services in the
Alexa top 5K websites. We observe a gradual drop of new
a&t services detected by ad-blocking blacklists: on average
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from 19% in 2011 to 10% in 2017.
Update speed of ad-blocking blacklists. We introduce two
new metrics that measure the speed of updates of ad-blocking
blacklists by (de)listing third-party a&t domains. Most of the
ad-blocking blacklists have proactively detected a&t services
since 2009. Among the analyzed ad-blocking blacklists, we
found that AdZHosts has the highest average reactive score
of 0.6 and Mahakala has the highest average proactive score
of 0.49.
II. ADS AND TRACKING ON WEB
We briefly discuss the mechanism of third-party online a&t
services and overview ad-blocking blacklists.
Online ads and web tracking: Many online businesses
and their revenue depend on online advertisements delivered
by third-parties. With the advent of new technologies and
platforms, third-party online a&t services (resp. websites’
publishers) have adopted new ways to deliver ads and track
users’ interaction. In Web platform, webpages isolate adver-
tisements from content by placing ads in an iframe, where
ad and tracking content hosted in the iframe is isolated from
the hosting webpage, and browsers allow only specific cross
frame interactions [27]. The website publisher includes the ad
and tracking components (i.e., JavaScript codes and cookies
belonging to a third-party ad and tracking service) in their
websites and allocate iframes to display ads. The website
publisher is paid by the ad provider based on the number of
ad clicks or impressions, or both. Most often, these techniques
track users across websites for targeted ads—delivering ads
based on their browsing/search or purchase history—revealing
sensitive information about website users.
Ads and tracking services operate by storing the user’s
personal identifiable information (PII) in the form of browser
cookies, HTML5 local storage and flash cookies which is then
shared with (other) third-parties either implicitly via HTTP
referrer or explicitly through tracker-provided JavaScript pro-
grams. If the user is tracked within the website, only by the
first party domain (website directly visited by the user), it
is termed as first-party tracking. An application of first-party
tracking is to count the repeated visits of a user to the website
for analytics. If the user is tracked on the website by another
domain, this is termed as third-party tracking. For example, if
the user visits bbc.com, and the advertisement on bbc.com
is fetched from advertiser.com, then the user’s browser
sends a request to advertiser.com without the user being
aware of it. In our study, we focus on the JavaScript programs
containing third-party domains which are embedded in the
websites that are popular according to Alexa websites ranking.
Therefore, in this paper, the terms ‘ads and trackers’ and ‘third-
party ads and trackers’ are used interchangeably to mean third-
party ads and tracking domains.
Ad-blocking blacklists: To counter the privacy threat posed
by third-party a&t services, several ad-blocking tools have
been developed. They include pop-up blockers, privacy pre-
serving web proxies (like Privoxy [23], Proxomitron [24], and
Pi-hole [22]) to filter and block a&t traffic at network-layer and
ad-blocking browser extensions (e.g., Adblock Plus, Ghostery,
and Disconnect) that prevent web resources from rendering in
the browser [32], [33]. The most popular of these tools are the
ad-blocking browser extensions which rely on filter-lists (also
referred to as tracking prevention lists or ad-blocking lists),
comprising of sets of URLs and domains of a&t services.
These blacklists are either crowd-sourced with feedback from
web users or maintained by ad-blocking tools developers.
Table I overviews several well-known a&t blacklists used by
ad-blocking tools.
III. DATASET AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we provide an overview of our dataset and
our measurement methodology.
A. Dataset
We aim to study the prevalence of a&t services in popular
websites worldwide. We choose two sets of popular websites:
(i) Alexa top 5K global websites (5K); and (ii) Alexa top 5K
websites in the following fourteen countries: Australia (AU),
Brazil (BR), Canada (CA), China (CN), Germany (DE), Israel
(IL), India (IN), Iran (IR), Russia (RU), Saudi Arabia (SA),
Singapore (SG), Ukraine (UA), United Kingdom (UK), and
United States (US).
To conduct our longitudinal study, we use web data from the
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. Since 1996, the Way-
back Machine has archived full websites, including JavaScript
codes, style sheets, and any multimedia resources that it
can identify statically from the site’s content. We refer to a
single capture of a webpage (resp. a&t domains in an ad-
blocking blacklist) as a snapshot. Wayback Machine mirrors
past snapshots of these websites on its own servers. We
scrape the HTML DOM (Document Object Model, where
HTML elements are defined as objects) of Alexa top 5K
global and country-wise websites. The purpose of scraping
the HTML DOM is to extract all JavaScript codes (along
with their sources) from the websites, which is then used
for our analysis. Wayback Machine has a number of archived
snapshots, with varying intervals, for each website. We utilize
Memento API [20] to capture snapshots at intervals of three
months to detect most—if not all—of the ads and tracking
domains that appeared on a website for a given year, during
the period of 2009 to 2017. Memento API provides the nearest
time-stamp for the archived snapshot of a website (resp. an ad-
blocking blacklist) from the date provided.
We empirically observed that 85% of the snapshots
are within an interval of 6 months. From these snap-
shots, we then obtain third-party sources from the em-
bedded JavaScript codes, and by comparing it with the
second level domains of ad-blocking blacklists, we obtain
the a&t domains in the crawled websites. For example,
if http://ad.doubleclick.net/dot.gif appears in
the script tag of sportsbet.com, then the second level do-
main (doubleclick.net) is extracted from the URL, and
compared against the domains in the ad-blocking blacklists.
Similarly, by using Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine,
we obtain the snapshots of ad-blocking blacklists. Table I lists
the number of distinct domains and the snapshots period of
the analyzed ad-blocking blacklists.
TABLE I: Overview of the analyzed ad-blocking blacklists.
Snapshots # Distinct
Blacklist Description Period Domains
AdZHosts [11] Ad/tracker/malicious hosts 2017-17 81,294
AdGuard [10] Ad/tracker/phishing hosts 2017-17 12,881
Cameleon [12] Ad/tracker hosts 2009-16 47,390
CyberCrime [13] Tracker/malware/phishing hosts 2013-16 6,557
EasyList [14] Ad/trackers/analytics 2010-17 13,882
FanboySocial [17] Social buttons/widgets hosts 2013-17 282
EasyPrivacy [16] Trackers/analytics hosts 2011-17 7,050
QuidsUp [25] Tracker/malicious hosts 2017-17 865
EasyList China [15] Chinese EasyList websites 2014-17 18,639
hpHosts [18] Ad/tracker/malicious hosts 2009-17 856,498
MVPs [21] Ad/tracker/malicious hosts 2011-17 414,461
AdAway [9] Mobile ad/tracker hosts 2013-16 137
Disconnect [7] Ad/tracker hosts 2015-16 15,238
Mahakala [19] Ad/tracker hosts 2015-17 1,846,198
Sa-blacklist [26] Ad/tracker hosts 2009-13 1,253,243
B. Methodology
The objective of this work is three fold. We study the: (i)
prominence of a&t domains on the Alexa top 5K worldwide
as well as top 5K websites in different countries, (ii) rate of
change of ad-blocking blacklists, and (iii) update speed of ad-
blocking blacklists.
Prominence of a&t domains: For our first objective,
we compare the second-level domains of JavaScript sources
(observed in retrospectively crawled top 5K websites from the
years 2009 to 2017) with those of known a&t domains from
the ad-blocking blacklists. This comparison reveals the number
of a&t domains blocked in different ad-blocking blacklists’
yearly snapshots and the number of websites that embed them.
By measuring the number of a&t domains on the Alexa
top 5K websites of different countries, we also measure the
prevalence of a&t domains in a given country’s top websites.
Besides detecting existing a&t domains in the wild, an effec-
tive ad-blocking blacklist also has to evolve and detect new
a&t domains over time to counter the ever-changing tracking
landscape. Therefore, we also investigate the number of new
a&t domains detected by the ad-blocking blacklists from 2009
to 2017.
Rate of change of ad-blocking blacklists: For our second
objective, we compare the a&t domains detected in two
consecutive years. This comparison reveals whether there has
been any change in the a&t domains blocked compared with
the preceding year, and indicates the evolution of a&t domains
in the ad-blocking blacklist. To this end, we propose the
stability metric:
Stability =
| Ti ∩ Ti−1 |
| Ti ∪ Ti−1 | , (1)
where Ti and Ti−1 are the sets of distinct a&t domains
detected in the current year, i, and the preceding year, i− 1.
Stability score of 1 implies that the list of a&t domains blocked
in a given year is identical to the list from the preceding year,
and stability score of 0 implies that the list of a&t domains
blocked in a given year is completely different than the list
from the preceding year. By default, the stability of any ad-
blocking blacklist for the first year is always zero.
From Eq. 1, the stability score of an ad-blocking blacklist
may be low, however, it can detect new a&t domains, because
the stability score considers the given year and the preceding
year only. Therefore, if a&t domains that were blocked in
years before the preceding year are detected again, they have
no impact on the measurement of stability. To overcome this
limitation, we introduce the diversity metric, which measures
the ratio of new a&t domains detected by the ad-blocking
blacklist for a given year. The diversity of an ad-blocking
blacklist for a given year is measured as:
Diversity = 1− | Ti ∩ Ta || Ti | , (2)
where Ta is the set of distinct a&t domains detected in all
previous years. So a diversity of 1 implies that all the a&t
domains blocked in a given year are new, i.e., they have not
been detected by that ad-blocking blacklist in the previous
years, and a diversity of 0 implies that none of the a&t domains
blocked in a given year are new. By default, the diversity score
for any ad-blocking blacklist is always 1 for the first year.
Update speed of ad-blocking blacklists: For our third
objective, we study the speed by which each blacklist updated
itself to encounter new threats. The time difference is taken to
be the number of days between the first occurrence of an a&t
domain in a website in the given year, and its addition to the
blacklist. The time difference is taken to be positive if an a&t
domain is seen on the web before it gets added to the blacklist.
It is negative otherwise. We consider the blacklist is reactive
if the time difference is positive, and proactive otherwise. We
aim to introduce the metrics for which a high score implies
high performance. The performance of a blacklist is considered
good if it detects more a&t domains in the least amount of time
or it contains a&t domains prior to them being observed on the
web. Therefore, to measure the reactive score, we divide the
number of a&t domains per website detected reactively by the
average time difference, and compute proactive score by taking
the product of the number of a&t domains per website detected
proactively and average time difference. The scores are then
normalized between 0 and 1. The reactive and proactive scores
of an ad-blocking blacklist for a given year are measured as:
Reactive =
(
∑domains|Treact|
tdays
)
Reactivemax
(3)
Proactive =
(
∑domains | Tproact | ) ∗ | tdays |
Proactivemax
(4)
where Treact and Tproact are the set of distinct a&t domains
per website detected reactively and proactively, respectively, in
the given year and tdays is the average time difference in days
to add those a&t domains in blacklists. Since for proactive a&t
domains blocked the average time difference is negative, we
only consider the magnitude and ignore the negative sign.
A low reactive (resp. proactive) score implies that the
ad-blocking blacklist is either blocking low number of a&t
domains or it is taking a large amount of time to add a&t
domains in the blacklist (or in case of proactive score, adds
a&t domains just recently before being observed in the top
5K websites) or both. A high reactive (resp. proactive) score
implies that the ad-blocking blacklist is either blocking large
quantities of a&t domains or it is taking less amount of time
to add those a&t domains in the list (or in case of proactive
score, adds a&t domains prior to when they are observed in
the top 5K websites) or both.
Note that if an ad-blocking blacklist started its service (or
we capture its first snapshot from Wayback Machine) after the
first occurrence of a given a&t domain on the web, the reactive
score is computed by taking the time difference from when the
a&t domains are added to a given ad-blocking blacklist. If an
a&t domain appears in the first version (or snapshot) of a given
blacklist then we consider the time difference as 1 instead of
0 (to avoid division by 0).
Similarly, for a given ad-blocking blacklist, we compute
the reactive and proactive scores per country per year. We
then average the scores over the countries and years. The
normalized reactive and proactive scores are then computed
by dividing the score by the maximum observed score at the
lowest aggregation level i.e., total a&t domains per year per
country.
In Section IV-B, we use the above four metrics for different
countries. All these metrics take the set of a&t domains as
input. For the ad-blocking blacklists, that set of a&t domains
comprises the distinct a&t domains blocked by the given
ad-blocking blacklist. For countries, the set of a&t domains
consists of the distinct a&t domains that occurred in ad-
blocking blacklists on the Alexa top 5K websites of the given
country. For example, the stability of a country measures the
similarity in the a&t domains detected (by the union of all the
ad-blocking blacklists) on the Alexa top 5K websites of that
country compared with the preceding year. Similarly, we use
the other three metrics for the countries.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Next, we present results of our analysis. We measure the
prominence of a&t domains to establish whether some coun-
tries’ top 5K websites consistently had high number of a&t
domains over the period of time, and study whether websites
added new a&t domains each year to avoid ad-blocking tools.
In order to understand the variation in effectiveness of ad-
blocking blacklists in recent years, we investigate how the ad-
blocking blacklists have performed in recent years in terms of
number of a&t domains detected on the Alexa top 5K websites,
and their rate of change measured by stability and diversity
metrics. We also investigate the update speed of ad-blocking
blacklists in terms of reactive and proactive scores.
A. Prominence of Ads and Tracking Domains
Annual Measurement of a&t domains: From the crawled
data, we measure the number of a&t services observed in each
year. Figure 1a shows the number of a&t domains blocked by
ad-blocking blacklists. We observe that a&t domains peak in
2011, before gradually declining to the mean number 317,357
of a&t domains for all the years. One possible explanation
for the decline after 2011 is that some websites embed new
a&t domains over time either because the a&t domain is not
functioning anymore or to evade ad-blocking tools [45]. Also,
all the new a&t domains may not have been detected yet by the
analyzed ad-blocking blacklists, and thus not reflected in the
annual a&t domains measurement. For example, we note that
in 2011, wikia.com embed google-analytics.com,
quantserve.com, and nocookie.net in its HTML
whereas in 2016 wikia.com had only optimizely.com
as a third-party a&t domain.
Country-wise measurement: Next, we map the a&t do-
mains observed on the Alexa top 5K websites of different
countries. We acknowledge that there are some limitations
in capturing snapshots with Wayback Machine, and many
websites from top 5K had to be discarded due to the challenges
mentioned in §VI. Therefore, the number of websites do not
remain equal for all the countries, and instead of measuring the
total number of a&t domains in all the websites, we measure
the average number of a&t domains per website for each
country.
Figure 1b shows the union of distinct a&t domains per
website from 2009 to 2017. We observe that the US, Canada,
and the UK have the most number of a&t domains per
website. As the ad-blocking blacklists are mostly updated
through crowd-sourcing [43], the prevalence of a&t domains
across countries also suggests that the crowd-sourcing users
for the analyzed ad-blocking blacklists are more active in
the countries reporting the most number of a&t domains,
compared to countries like Iran and China, that have detected
the lowest number of a&t domains per website.
Figure 4a shows the annual number of a&t domains blocked
on the Alexa top 5K websites of the top seven countries
in Figure 1b. Note that for ease of presentation, we select
countries with most number of a&t domains detected on the
Alexa top 5K websites. The a&t domains country-wise trend
is similar to the overall trend in Figure 1a, suggesting that
the new a&t domains may not yet have been detected by the
analyzed ad-blocking blacklists.
Domain-wise measurement of a&t domains: Figure 1c
shows the percentage of websites with a change in the number
of a&t domains from the preceding year. We observe that,
from 2010 to 2017, the presence of a&t domains has been
dynamic on an average of 55% of the analyzed websites, with
45% exhibiting an annual increase and 10% of the websites
exhibiting an annual decrease. Moreover, nearly 80% of those
changes are a difference of one or two a&t domains (cf. Figure
1d). For example, in tomshardware.com there are four a&t
domains in 2009, ten in 2010, six in 2011, one in 2012, five
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Fig. 1: (a) Annual sum of distinct a&t domains per website (b) Distinct a&t domains per website on the Alexa top 5K websites of each
country (c) Annual Percentage of websites with an increase or decrease in number of a&t domains from preceding year (d) Distribution of
change in number of a&t domains from the websites in Figure 1c.
in 2013, two in 2014, none in 2015, two in 2016, and one in
2017.
Measurement of a&t domains in blacklists: Table II
lists the number of a&t domains detected by the ad-blocking
blacklists, and the mean time (in days) taken to add them
in blacklist. The table also lists the number of a&t domains
detected reactively and proactively for each ad-blocking black-
list. The number of a&t domains detected is the annual sum
of distinct a&t domains per website for the years 2009 to
2017. We observe (cf. Table II) that the number 2,460K of a&t
domains blocked by Mahakala is the highest. Not surprisingly,
Mahakala also contains the most number 1,846K of distinct
a&t domains We also observe that EasyList and EasyPrivacy
contain 13,882 and 7,050 a&t domains, respectively, and these
two blacklists are able to detect 393K instances of those a&t
domains within the analyzed top 5K websites. Surprisingly,
Sa-blacklist that contain 1,253K a&t domains is only able to
detect 65,698 instances of those a&t domains. This reveals that
EasyList and EasyPrivacy though fairly lean contain mostly
useful rules to block a&t domains in the top 5K websites.
Conversely Sa-blacklist contains mostly stale or otherwise
useless rules to block a&t domains on the Alexa top 5K
websites. CyberCrime blocks the least number 3,349 of a&t
domains, and one reason why this number is low is that
a significant fraction of domains in CyberCrime belongs to
malvertisements [3].
Table II lists ad-blocking blacklists ranked by the number of
a&t domains blocked on the Alexa top 5K websites. Annual
number of a&t domains blocked by the top seven ad-blocking
blacklists in figure 3a indicates that the prevalence of a&t
domains peaks in 2011 for all the lists and then gradually
declines and remains almost unaltered over the remaining
period. This trend is similar to the number of a&t domains
observed in Figure 1a.
B. Rate of Change
Stability and diversity analysis of blacklists: Figure 2a
shows the average stability and diversity scores of the ad-
blocking blacklists in detecting a&t domains in the top 5K
global as well as the top 5K websites in different countries
from 2009 to 2017. We observe that the ad-blocking blacklists
having high stability scores tend to have low diversity scores
and vice-versa. For instance, AdAway and Fanboy Social have
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Fig. 2: (a) Average stability and diversity score of ad-blocking
blacklists (b) Distribution of time taken (in days) to add a&t domains
in each blacklist. The blacklists on left side are proactive whereas
those on right side are reactive.
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Fig. 3: (a) Annual a&t domains detected by blacklists (b) Stability
and (c) Diversity of blacklists. With the gradual rise in stability and
gradual decline in diversity, blacklists are blocking more a&t domains
similar to the preceding years, and less ratio of new a&t domains.
highest average stability and lowest average diversity, whereas
CyberCrime and AdGuard have lowest average stability and
highest average diversity. The average stability scores of top
seven ad-blocking blacklists (in Table II) range between 0.5
and 0.6, and the average diversity scores are in the range of
0.2 to 0.3.
The annual average stability and diversity scores of the ad-
blocking blacklists in Figure 3b and 3c show the gradual rise
in stability and the gradual decline in diversity of ad-blocking
blacklists, respectively. The stability is 0 and diversity is 1 in
2009. In 2010, we observe that the set of distinct a&t domains
blocked by the ad-blocking blacklists is significantly different
from the one in 2009. This is evident from the stability and
diversity scores, which are at their lowest and highest peaks,
TABLE II: Number of a&t domains detected and time taken (in
days) to add them in ad-blocking blacklists. The number of a&t
domains detected is the annual sum of distinct a&t domains per
website for the years 2009 to 2017. Negative values for days indicate
that the a&t domains were added in blacklists before being observed
on the Alexa top 5K websites.
Black- Total a&t Mean # Reactive Mean # Proactive Mean
List Domains Days a&t Domains Days a&t Domains Days
Mahakala 2,460,303 -70 1,915,941 35 544,362 -438
hpHosts 662,287 -289 240,112 1,220 422,175 -1,148
MVPs 642,023 294 399,207 1,093 242,816 -1,020
AdZHosts 566,228 -5 509,887 1 56,341 -46
EasyList China 423,514 -78 290,945 135 132,569 -545
EasyList 393,990 -381 150,384 815 243,606 -1,120
EasyPrivacy 393,914 -510 143,316 321 250,598 -985
AdGuard 386,220 -3 370,247 1 15,973 -80
Cameleon 365,851 -1,159 28,337 489 337,514 -1,297
Disconnect 199,773 -93 155,389 7 44,384 -441
FanboySocial 135,163 -283 76,398 53 58,765 -719
QuidsUp 116,297 -8 101,852 1 14,445 -68
AdAway 79,861 -290 47,370 25 32,491 -749
Sa-blacklist 65,598 -810 14,117 546 51,481 -1,182
CyberCrime 3,349 10 3,214 22 135 -257
respectively. Since the diversity score is less than 0.5, it implies
that the set of distinct a&t domains blocked in 2010 had
less than half the a&t domains that were newly detected in
2010. We also observe a sharp increase in stability and steep
decline in diversity in 2011, and no significant variation in the
later years. This suggests that although the annual set of a&t
domains blocked by each ad-blocking blacklist is significantly
similar (at least 65% in 2017) to the annual set of a&t domains
from the preceding years, new a&t domains are still appearing
on the Alexa top 5K websites.
Stability and diversity analysis of countries: Figure 5a
shows the average stability and diversity scores of different
countries based on the a&t domains blocked on the Alexa
top 5K websites. The score for each country is computed by
measuring the stability and diversity for each year and then
taking the average over the years. We observe that Singapore,
UK, and US have the lowest diversity and conversely the
highest stability scores, whereas Ukraine, Israel, and Saudi
Arabia have the highest diversity and conversely the lowest
stability scores.
Figures 4b and 4c show the annual stability and diversity
scores, respectively, of the top seven countries (in Figure 1b).
Although the stability scores are fluctuating sharply for some
countries, we notice that the diversity scores remain stable
from 2011 onwards. This suggests that the percentage of new
a&t domains blocked on the Alexa top 5K websites in these
countries drops slightly from 20% in 2011 to 15% in 2017 at
the most.
C. Update Speed
Reactive and proactive analysis of blacklists: Figure
2b shows the distribution of time taken in days to add a&t
domains observed on the Alexa top 5K websites, in the ad-
blocking blacklists. In the distribution, we have omitted the
a&t domains that were observed on the Alexa top 5K websites
before the ad-blocking blacklists’ first snapshot. We notice that
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Fig. 4: (a) Annual a&t domains per website blocked on the Alexa
top 5K of countries (b) Average stability and (c) Average diversity
scores of top seven countries.
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Fig. 5: (a) Average stability and diversity (b) Average reactive and
proactive scores of countries. Countries with high proactive scores
also tend to have a high number of a&t domains on their Alexa top
5K websites (cf. Figure 1b).
since we started capturing the a&t domains in the ad-blocking
blacklists (or the ad-blocking blacklists started their service),
barring MVPs and CyberCrime, the ad-blocking blacklists
have reported most of the a&t domains proactively.
Next, we measure the update speed of ad-blocking blacklists
with reactive and proactive metrics. Figure 6a shows the
average reactive and proactive scores for the ad-blocking
blacklists. Mahakala has the highest average proactive score
whereas AdZHosts has the highest average reactive score. We
note that among the top seven blacklists in Table II, six are in
the top seven blacklists by proactive score.
Figure 6b shows the annual reactive scores for the ad-
blocking blacklists. All the a&t domains blocked by AdZHosts
from 2009 to 2016 were included in the first captured snapshot
of AdZHosts. Therefore, the time difference was taken as 1
day which resulted in a very high reactive score. The rise in
the reactive score of AdZHosts from 2009 to 2011 is due to
the rise in the number of a&t domains blocked by AdZHosts in
that period (see Figure 3a). Mahakala’s reactive score peaks in
2012, and then declines gradually from 2013 to 2015 because
of an increase in the average time difference. Furthermore,
in 2016, the reactive score of Mahakala decreases sharply
because of the low number of reactive a&t domains identified.
In Figure 6c we notice a gradual increase in proactive score
from the year in which we first captured the snapshot of the
ad-blocking blacklist, because of an increase in the average
time difference with each subsequent year. The proactive score
does not rise significantly for AdZHosts in 2017 because the
average time difference is least compared to the other ad-
blocking blacklists. The sharp rise in Mahakala’s proactive
score in 2016 and 2017 is due to Mahakala blocking the most
number of a&t domains in the analyzed top 5K websites.
This suggests that since ad-blocking blacklists started their
service, their proactive scores have been increasing gradually
at nearly the same rate, apart from Mahakala which has risen
sharply since 2015. Therefore, based on the number of a&t
domains blocked and the reactive and proactive score, we
conclude that in the last two years, Mahakala has been the
most effective ad-blocking blacklist. The number of black-
listed domains in Mahakala are also the highest, and if we are
applying ad-blocking blacklist on a performance constrained
device then a leaner ad-blocking blacklist is most effective. In
that case, EasyList, EasyList China and EasyPrivacy are the
recommended ad-blocking blacklists.
Reactive and proactive analysis of countries: Figure 5b
illustrates the average reactive and proactive scores of different
countries from 2009 to 2017. US has the highest reactive and
proactive scores, whereas Iran has the lowest reactive and
proactive scores. Out of the top seven countries ranked by the
number of a&t domains per website (in Figure 1b), six have
the highest proactive scores. Furthermore, among the bottom
five countries ranked by a&t domains per website, four are the
bottom most countries by proactive scores.
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Fig. 6: (a) Average reactive and proactive scores of blacklists (b)
Reactive and (c) Proactive scores of top seven blacklists.
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Fig. 7: (a) Reactive and (b) Proactive scores of countries. The number
of a&t domains detected reactively has decreased in recent years,
whereas those identified proactively has risen.
Figures 7a and 7b show the annual reactive and proactive
scores, respectively, of the top seven countries by the number
of a&t domains per website. We notice a gradual increase
in the reactive score of countries from 2009 to 2015. The
reactive score depends on the number of distinct a&t domains
per website detected and the average time difference in days
(cf Eq. 3). We notice a steep increase in reactive scores in
2016 because of less average time difference. Then in 2017,
we observe a steep decline in reactive scores. Although the
average time difference is less in 2017, the number of distinct
a&t domains per website detected is also less. In Figure
7b we observe a gradual rise in proactive score from 2009
to 2015 due to an increase in average time difference (cf.
Eq. 4). Though the time difference increases steadily in 2016
and 2017, the number of a&t domains blocked proactively in
2016 and 2017 is significantly greater than the previous years.
Therefore, we observe a steep increase in proactive scores from
2016 onwards. This suggests that since 2016, the prevalence of
a&t domains detected proactively has significantly increased.
V. RELATED WORK
Several research works focus on characterization and pre-
vention of online tracking [30], [32], [36], [35], [38], [39],
[40], [42], [41]. We classify the Web tracking literature in two
classes and discuss them below.
Prevalence of online ads and tracking: Krishnamurthy
and Wills [35], use longitudinal measurement snapshots to
show that the third-party a&t domains usage was already
increasing significantly between 2005 and 2008. Their work
provides a comprehensive overview of how some organizations
(e.g., Google) have increased their tracking coverage both by
increased usage of some of the third-party domains that they
own, and through active acquisition of new domains (e.g.,
DoubleClick) that provide ads services, analytics, and tracking.
Metwalley et al., [39] did a passive study on the interaction
of users with a&t domains and ad-blockers. They showed that
only one in five internet users have installed ad-blocker plugins
on their web browsers, and nearly four out of five internet users
interact with a&t domains as soon as they begin to browse.
Pujol et al. [40] extended their work using traces by measuring
traffic in ISP. They showed that the ad component is significant
in web traffic, and many users install ad-blockers to block
advertisements rather than protect their privacy.
Our work focuses on the evolution of a&t domains and ad-
blocking lists. We perform a longitudinal study to show the
prevalence of a&t domains in the popular web of different
countries. We show that websites embed new a&t domains
over time to evade ad-blocking lists and provide targeted
advertisements to the users. The ad-blocking lists continue
to detect new a&t domains each year. We also provide the
update speed of ad-blocking lists to illustrate if they have been
reactive or proactive in handling a&t domains.
Lerner et al. found an increase in the prevalence and
complexity of tracking, as well as an increase in the inter-
connectedness of the ecosystem by analyzing Internet Archive
data from 1996 to 2016 [36]. Fruchter et al. studied geographic
variations in tracking [31]. More recently, Libert studied third-
party HTTP requests on the top 1 million sites [37], providing
a view of tracking across the web. In this study, Libert showed
that Google can track users across nearly 80% of sites through
its various third-party domains. Englehardt and Narayanan
detected third-party fingerprinting services on Alexa top 1M
websites [29].
Characterization of online ads and tracking: Roesner et
al., [41] categorize mainstreaming tracking and analytics ser-
vices and studied their prevalence in the wild. Ikram et al., [32]
evaluate the usability of five different tracking prevention
plugins and reveal that contemporary blacklists based tracking
prevention tools are inefficient and have high false positives.
Ikram et al. [33] classify the tools for browser plugins,
VPN or proxy-based tools, DNS-based filtering, and stand-
alone browsers. Their work also delineate tracking prevention
techniques for mobile as well as desktop environments. Black-
lists are discussed and machine-learning based techniques are
evaluated for tracking prevention [32], [28].
VI. LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Despite our best efforts to collect the dataset from the
Wayback Machine to perform our study, there are still some
limitations. First, the webpage requested to Wayback Machine
sometimes encounters a 301 redirect, meaning that the page
has permanently moved to a new location, or a 302 redirect
meaning that the move is only temporary. Second, websites are
archived with varied frequency on Wayback Machine. Hence,
it is possible to miss an a&t domain embedded in a website
for the duration the website was not archived by Wayback
Machine. When we encounter a web page redirect on
a given snapshot, we discard that snapshot and pick another
snapshot from the same three month interval. Similarly, if we
are unable to obtain any snapshot in that three month interval
after four tries, we skip that interval altogether and move to
the next three month interval. For a website, if we are unable
to capture at least a single snapshot for any year between 2009
and 2017, we discard that website from our analysis.
We have presented an approach to measure the longitudinal
performance of ad-blocking blacklists. We have proposed two
metrics, stability and diversity, that measure the rate of change
of ad-blocking blacklists, and introduced two metrics, reactive
and proactive, that measure the update speed of ad-blocking
blacklists. Our analysis revealed that since 2011, more than
50% of the crawled websites embedded a different number
of a&t domains compared to the preceding year. Ad-blocking
blacklists also continue to detect new a&t domains each year
(at most 15% in 2017). Among the ad-blocking blacklists,
Mahakala and hpHosts blocked the most number of a&t
domains on the web, but these two ad-blocking blacklists
also contain the highest number of black-listed domains.
On resource-constrained devices, leaner ad-blocking blacklists
like EasyList, EasyPrivacy, and EasyList China, that provide
slightly less coverage are more suitable. Among the countries
we evaluated, the US, Canada, and the UK have the highest
number of distinct a&t domains per website in the popular
web and also the highest proactive scores. This suggests that
the ad-blocking lists update by prioritizing the a&t domains
reported in the popular websites from these countries.
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